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Abstract
Background: The new International Health Regulations (IHR) require World Health Organization (WHO) member states 
to assess their core capacity for surveillance. Such reviews also have the potential to identify important surveillance 
gaps, improve the organisation of disparate surveillance systems and to focus attention on upstream hazards, 
determinants and interventions.
Methods: We developed a surveillance sector review method for evaluating all of the surveillance systems and related 
activities across a sector, in this case those concerned with infectious diseases in New Zealand. The first stage was a 
systematic description of these surveillance systems using a newly developed framework and classification system. Key 
informant interviews were conducted to validate the available information on the systems identified.
Results: We identified 91 surveillance systems and related activities in the 12 coherent categories of infectious diseases 
examined. The majority (n = 40 or 44%) of these were disease surveillance systems. They covered all categories, 
particularly for more severe outcomes including those resulting in death or hospitalisations. Except for some notifiable 
diseases and influenza, surveillance of less severe, but important infectious diseases occurring in the community was 
largely absent. There were 31 systems (34%) for surveillance of upstream infectious disease hazards, including risk and 
protective factors. This area tended to have many potential gaps and lack integration, partly because such systems 
were operated by a range of different agencies, often outside the health sector. There were fewer surveillance systems 
for determinants, including population size and characteristics (n = 9), and interventions (n = 11).
Conclusions: It was possible to create and populate a workable framework for describing all the infectious diseases 
surveillance systems and related activities in a single developed country and to identify potential surveillance sector 
gaps. This is the first stage in a review process that will lead to identification of priorities for surveillance sector 
development.
Background
The new International Health Regulations (IHR), which
came into force in June 2007, require World Health Orga-
nization (WHO) member states to assess their core
capacity for surveillance and response within two years
from this date[1]. Such actions should strengthen the
capacity of nations to detect infectious diseases that may
represent potential public health emergencies of interna-
tional concern (PHEIC), notify such events to the WHO,
and implement appropriate early interventions [2].
Reviewing surveillance systems for infectious diseases
also has the potential to identify worthwhile improve-
ments to the organisation of such systems at a country-
level. It may also identify gaps in these systems and
whether or not important diseases, hazards, determi-
nants, and interventions are under surveillance at all.
We describe in this article a review of these systems and
use the term surveillance sector review as this work seeks
to identify and examine all of the important surveillance
activities across a defined area of disease burden. This
approach is therefore distinct from, but complementary
to, established methods that concentrate on evaluation of
specific surveillance systems [3]. Such methods have
often focused on important system attributes such as
timeliness [4], sensitivity [5], and ability to detect out-
breaks [6], though they have also been applied to evalua-
tion of quite broad disease surveillance systems [7].
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A  surveillance sector review builds upon concepts of
more integrated surveillance promoted by the WHO,
notably for linking surveillance and action [8]. We
broaden this approach to consider hazards, consistent
with the Global Burden of Disease focus on risk factors
and their surveillance [9] (eg, the STEPS programme for
surveillance of risk factors for non-communicable dis-
eases [10]). Our approach is also consistent with frame-
works for environmental health surveillance (such as the
DPSEEA: Driving-force - Pressure - State - Exposure -
Effect - Action framework) that consider the causal web
of policies and factors that contribute to health outcomes
[11]. Here we attempt to extend the concept of integrated
surveillance to an entire disease sector including associ-
ated health hazards, determinants and interventions.
In this article we aim to: (i) Present a framework for
describing and categorising diverse surveillance systems
and illustrate this by applying it to all of the surveillance
systems operating for one disease sector in a single devel-
oped country (in this case infectious diseases in New
Zealand); (ii) Present an approach for systematically
reviewing the public health surveillance systems operat-
ing across a broad public health sector (a surveillance sec-
tor review); and (iii) Discuss preliminary findings from
this review to illustrate its use for identifying potential
surveillance sector gaps that require assessment in later
stages of the surveillance sector review.
Methods
Framework for describing and categorising surveillance 
systems
Since we could identify no published model or frame-
work in the literature for systematically describing and
categorising a full range of surveillance systems, we
developed one for this review. We took our basic defini-
tion of public health surveillance to be: "the ongoing sys-
tematic collection, analysis, interpretation and
dissemination of data regarding a health-related event for
use in public health action to reduce morbidity and to
improve health" [3].
For this review, we interpreted health-related events to
include diseases and also upstream hazards and determi-
nants as well as interventions that relate to infectious dis-
eases. Diseases were taken to include injury, changes in
health status and health outcomes. Hazards were defined
as risk and protective factors (including behaviour, popu-
lation vulnerability, agent characteristics, and exposures)
that may affect health through specific, direct causal
mechanisms. Determinants were causal factors that may
affect health through multiple, often indirect pathways.
Interventions were actions taken to control or prevent
the occurrence of disease or to minimise its negative
health effects.
We used the concept of upstream to refer to events and
factors that were causally related to the disease or other
health outcome of interest, and preceded it. For example,
these can be proximal hazards, such as exposure to a per-
son with active tuberculosis, or more distal determinants,
such as socio-economic position and household crowd-
ing [12]. Interventions concerned with prevention may
precede disease (primary prevention) or be focused on
reducing the effects of disease (secondary and tertiary
prevention). The hypothesised relationship between
these components of surveillance is shown in Figure 1.
Public health surveillance has multiple aims. To facili-
tate the functional classification of surveillance systems,
we have grouped these aims into two broad purposes:
control-focused  and  strategy-focused  (see Appendix 1).
The purpose of control-focused surveillance is to identify
each occurrence of a particular disease, hazard, or other
health-related event that requires a specific response and
support delivery of an effective intervention. For exam-
ple, a single case of polio, a common-source salmonello-
sis outbreak, a shipment of contaminated produce, or an
un-immunised child. The purpose of strategy-focused
surveillance is to provide information to support preven-
tion strategies to reduce population health risk, such as
describing the epidemiology of the annual influenza sea-
son and the characteristics of the seasonal influenza
viruses.  Control-focused  surveillance usually provides
information that can also be used for strategy-focused
surveillance, so these purposes are often combined
within the same surveillance activity. By contrast, strat-
egy-focused  surveillance cannot generally support con-
trol-focused surveillance.
As part of this descriptive framework, we categorised
surveillance systems into five types:
• Event surveillance - defined as "prospective surveil-
lance to identify in a timely manner each occurrence of a
particular health-related event, including disease and
injury cases, outbreaks, health hazards and interven-
tions".
• Screening - defined as "surveillance to identify a par-
ticular inapparent disease or pre-disposing risk factor in
all members of a specified population, or a particular
health hazard in specified settings or environments".
• Service tracking - defined as "surveillance to identify
delivery and non-delivery of a particular intervention or
programme of agreed quality to specified individuals,
populations, and settings".
• Prevalence surveys - "surveillance based on repeated
surveys to measure the prevalence over time of a particu-
lar disease or injury, health state, health hazard, health
determinant or intervention use in a specified population
or setting". It ideally involves a representative sample of
the population or setting of interest.Baker et al. BMC Public Health 2010, 10:332
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/10/332
Page 3 of 16
• Monitoring - defined as "surveillance based on collec-
tion and periodic analysis and interpretation of informa-
tion to characterise the occurrence and distribution of a
particular health-related event, including disease and
injury cases, health states, health hazards, interventions,
and determinants." It may use data derived from event
surveillance, screening, service tracking, or from samples
of events (eg, sentinel surveillance, episodic surveillance).
These key terms are consistent with definitions in stan-
dard use [12], though they have been adapted for this
application to surveillance. In this framework, screening
can extend to hazards as in behavioural risk factor
screening [13], and environmental screening (eg, screen-
ing for resistant organisms in hospitals [14], or microbial
contaminants in drinking water [15]).
Framework for conducting a surveillance sector review
The framework we have developed for conducting a sur-
veillance sector review follows the broad stages shown in
Figure 2. We describe each stage in more detail below and
refer to how these stages were applied as part of this
review work in the New Zealand context.
1) Plan surveillance sector review
It is important to establish the aims and scope of the
review. This process will usually be part of negotiating the
mandate and resources for the work. Given that public
health surveillance is based on a collaborative network of
organisations and public health professionals, it is impor-
tant to engage effectively with the key stakeholders,
including end-users and surveillance system operators
[3]. We found that this was feasible in the New Zealand
setting to the stage reached in this work.
2) Systematically describe the current surveillance sector
To apply this framework to the infectious disease sector,
we divided it into meaningful categories. In the New Zea-
land setting, this step was facilitated by adapting a pre-
existing set of infectious diseases categories from a
national infectious disease strategy [16]. This process
resulted in the following 12 categories based on logical
groupings of diseases: vaccine preventable infections;
respiratory infections; infections from close physical con-
tact; sexually transmitted infections (STIs); congenital
and perinatal infections; blood and tissue borne infec-
tions; hospital acquired infections (HAIs) and antibiotic
Figure 1 Framework for classifying events under surveillance (diseases, hazards, determinants and interventions) based on their position 
along the causal pathway.
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Figure 2 Framework for carrying out a surveillance sector review (note that stage 2 forms the major part of this paper).
 
3. Describe surveillance information needs of major end users 
  Identify agencies and practitioners responsible for disease prevention and control in 
each category 
  Review information they require to support prevention strategies to reduce 
population health risk (strategy-focused surveillance) 
  Review information they require to control specific diseases, hazards, and other 
health-related events (control-focused surveillance) 
  Review potential future surveillance information need scenarios 
4. Assess performance of current surveillance systems 
  Review performance of strategy-focused surveillance, notably representativeness, 
completeness and validity 
  Review performance of control-focused surveillance, notably timeliness, sensitivity 
and security 
  Assess performance against current and future scenarios 
5. Identify important surveillance sector gaps 
  Identify potential surveillance gaps (leadership & resource gaps, design/structural 
gaps, operation/functional gaps) 
  Assess gaps against best international practice or theoretical standards 
  Assess the public health importance of identified gaps 
6. Identify priorities for surveillance sector improvement 
  Identify options for addressing high priority gaps 
  Review institutional arrangements and resources to support these options 
  Select priority options and recommended approaches for improving surveillance 
sector effectiveness and efficiency 
1. Plan surveillance sector review 
  Establish aims and scope of the review 
  Engage with stakeholders 
7. Communicate and implement findings 
  Communicate findings to stakeholders and/or implement them 
2. Systematically describe current surveillance sector 
  Divide disease burden into meaningful categories 
  Identify surveillance systems for disease/outcomes, hazards, determinants and 
interventions in each category 
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resistance; food borne infections; environmental and
water borne infections; zoonotic infections; vector borne
infections; and new, exotic and imported infections.
It is then necessary to identify the surveillance systems
operating in each category, which we were also able to do
for New Zealand (see Additional File 1). In this country
many of these systems had a specific name and identity
and were managed by a single agency (eg, the notifiable
disease surveillance system). Some classification difficul-
ties arose where an agency operated a range of related
surveillance activities that shared some common charac-
teristics (eg, the Institute for Environmental Science and
Research - ESR - operates several systems for laboratory
testing of different groups of microorganisms) or a com-
mon information collecting pathway for information that
was subsequently analysed and reported on for two dif-
ferent surveillance purposes (eg, the New Zealand Paedi-
atric Surveillance Unit includes acute flaccid paralysis
surveillance along with strategy-focused surveillance of a
range of paediatric conditions). The resulting listing of
surveillance systems could be presented diagrammati-
cally as a surveillance sector map using the framework
shown in Figure 1.
The next step is a systematic description of each identi-
fied system using the framework described in the previ-
ous section (see Additional File 2). In this review we have
tabulated for each system the following features: Event
under surveillance; Main purpose; Coverage (population
or setting); System type; Reporting source; Local/regional
collation; and National collation. There is a great deal of
additional information which could be used to describe
surveillance systems, notably a summary of the system
architecture, information collected, resources used, and
system performance. We considered this information less
critical for this stage of the review for New Zealand, so
have not presented it here.
3) Describe surveillance information needs of major end-
users
This component describes the surveillance information
requirements of end-users. It follows a somewhat analo-
gous approach to the previous section, except that it
focuses on information users rather than providers.
The first step is identifying the agencies and practitio-
ners responsible for disease prevention and control in
each disease category. These agencies and practitioners
include central government end-users (such as the Minis-
try of Health), regional agencies (such as public health
services) and institutional end-users (such as hospital
infection control staff), as well as practitioners working at
a range of levels inside and outside the health sector. A
major focus of this analysis is characterising end-user
information needs according to purpose using the same
distinction as already noted: control-focused surveillance
where end-users need to identify and respond to every
infectious disease event or scenario (which would include
IHR requirements); and strategy-focused  surveillance
where end-users would be asked to define the broad types
of strategic information they needed on infectious dis-
ease burden to enable them to formulate prevention poli-
cies and programmes and measure their effectiveness. An
important part of this assessment would be asking end-
users to identify their likely future surveillance informa-
tion needs. This step would be particularly important for
identifying uncommon and novel threats that require
control-focused surveillance.
Information gathering includes interviewing key infor-
mants from these agencies and reviewing their infectious
disease prevention and control strategies. It may also be
useful to review the aims of infectious disease surveil-
lance systems operating in other comparable countries.
4) Assess performance of current surveillance systems
This component is closely aligned to the kind of assess-
ment that would be produced from evaluation of a spe-
cific surveillance system [3]. In particular, it seeks to
gather empirical data on the performance of each individ-
ual surveillance system according to system attributes
such as usefulness. The performance of the surveillance
systems would be assessed according to the critical attri-
butes required for control-focused  surveillance (timeli-
ness, sensitivity, stability) and strategy-focused
surveillance (representativeness, completeness and valid-
ity).
Information gathering would ideally be based on
reviewing completed evaluations of existing surveillance
systems. This evidence base is generally quite limited, so
instead would often have to use semi-quantitative assess-
ments based on reviewing the outputs of existing systems
and interviews with system operators and users. For con-
trol-focused surveillance it should usually be possible to
estimate timeliness from assessing time-delays in each
step of the reporting pathway [4]. Estimating sensitivity
may be more difficult and usually requires use of multiple
surveillance sources (eg, by a capture-recapture method
[5]).
For surveillance of uncommon events and those that
have not yet occurred, it would be necessary to use sce-
nario-based exercises to assess system performance. This
requirement applies to many of the events that are cov-
ered by IHR requirements (where timeliness is probably
the single most important system attribute to assess [2]).
5) Identify important surveillance sector gaps
This component identifies high-level deficiencies in exist-
ing systems, processes and arrangements. We defined
nine types of surveillance sector "gaps" in three broad cat-
egories (Table 1). The first category is leadership and
resource gaps, which concern the whole sector. They
include potential gaps in the leadership and organisa-
tional structures to prioritise, develop and coordinate theBaker et al. BMC Public Health 2010, 10:332
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Table 1: Classification of potential surveillance sector gaps with illustrative examples
Gap name Description Example (from the current NZ situation)
A. Leadership & resource gaps
Surveillance leadership and organisational 
gap
Lack of sector leadership, coordination, 
mandate, and supportive organisational 
structures
No plan for prioritising the development of 
public health surveillance and limited 
coordination of existing systems
Surveillance workforce gap Lack of trained workforce in critical areas, 
such as epidemiology
Shortage of epidemiologists and data 
analysts to review and interpret findings 
from surveillance systems
Surveillance resource gap Lack of sector resources in critical areas, 
such as laboratory services and 
information technology
Limited information technology 
development resources for public health 
sector
B. Design/structural gaps
Surveillance system gap No surveillance system is established for 
important disease events, upstream 
hazards, determinants or interventions
No surveillance of most common 
syndromes in primary care (eg, 
gastroenteritis)
Surveillance scope gap A surveillance system is established, but its 
type, range of events covered, and scope 
of information it is designed to collect 
does not meet its purpose
Surveillance of hepatitis B and C is largely 
restricted to acute illness rather than 
chronic infectious cases
Surveillance coverage gap A surveillance system is established, but 
does not cover all of the necessary 
populations or settings
Absenteeism surveillance and emergency 
department syndromic surveillance for 
influenza-like illness is, in each case, 
confined to only one region in NZ
C. Operation/functional gaps
Surveillance performance gap An established system doesn't meet 
necessary requirements for key attributes, 
such as timeliness, sensitivity and validity
Reporting of hospital discharges and 
deaths from infectious diseases is 
complete but not timely, limiting the value 
of the information for disease control
Surveillance integration gap Surveillance systems exist but do not link 
information in a way that supports optimal 
prevention and control measures
Food and water borne disease surveillance 
is not routinely linked to drinking water 
distribution zones so limiting its capacity 
to detect water treatment failures
Surveillance analysis and communication 
gap
Surveillance systems operate but do not 
analyse and disseminate information in a 
way that supports effective action
Some national data on hospital-acquired 
infections is collected for health sector 
monitoring purposes but is not provided 
to infectious disease practitioners or policy 
makersBaker et al. BMC Public Health 2010, 10:332
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/10/332
Page 7 of 16
sector (leadership and organisational gap) as well as
potential gaps in the workforce and other resources
needed to sustain surveillance systems (workforce gap,
resource gap).
The second category is design and structural gaps,
which aim to identify important disease events, hazards,
determinants or interventions that are not covered by
surveillance systems. This category is concerned with sit-
uations where there is no system for surveillance of an
important event (system gap). Or an established system
has not been designed to collect all of the important
information to meet its intended purpose (scope gap) or is
not covering the necessary populations or settings (cover-
age gap).
The third broad category is operation and functional
gaps. These gaps include a focus on the performance of a
surveillance system (performance gap) which is closely
aligned to the kind of assessment that would be produced
from a specific surveillance system evaluation [3]. We
also identified a surveillance integration gap where "sur-
veillance systems exist but do not link information in a
way that supports optimal surveillance, prevention and
control measures". A related type is analysis and commu-
nication gap, which is concerned with ensuring that
information generated by multiple surveillance activities
across the sector is being analysed and communicated in
an optimal manner to support public health action.
Once these gaps have been identified they would be
assessed according to their importance. This assessment
would be based on the surveillance information needs
identified under stage three above. It is likely that it would
be supported by the use of a rating system that categor-
ised gaps according to their importance, distinguishing
control-focused and strategy-focused priority areas. There
are approaches for identifying disease surveillance priori-
ties that consider such factors as incidence, impact, pre-
ventability and outbreak potential [3]. Burden of disease
type analyses would also be useful to highlight the hazard
areas contributing most infectious diseases and therefore
particularly deserving of surveillance [17].
6) Identify priorities for surveillance sector improvement
This stage seeks to identify the recommended approaches
for improving surveillance sector effectiveness. It
includes identifying options for addressing high priority
gaps and the selection of optimal approaches.
This stage would review the broad institutional
arrangements for surveillance and associated activities to
identify the extent to which these might need to be modi-
fied to achieve the necessary sector improvements. These
institutional arrangements include national surveillance
functions (eg, surveillance system operation, information
collection, integration, analysis, laboratory testing, inter-
pretation, dissemination, aberration detection, investiga-
tion, modelling, quality assurance), national response
functions (eg, strategy formulation, policy advice, com-
munication, outbreak and epidemic management, emer-
gency response planning and management, linking to
other government agencies), national capacity develop-
ment functions (eg, sector engagement and governance,
system planning, evaluation and development, workforce
training and development), and regional/local surveil-
lance and response functions (eg, operation of regional/
local infectious disease surveillance systems, outbreak
detection investigation and management, periodic analy-
sis, reporting and interpretation of infectious disease dis-
tribution, integration of data from multiple surveillance
sources, development of prevention strategies).
The final part of this stage would be to select priority
options and recommended approaches for improving
surveillance sector effectiveness. This process would
need to include a high level of engagement with the sur-
veillance sector across agencies, levels and disciplinary
groups.
7) Communicate and implement findings
This final stage seeks to communicate the findings of the
review to stakeholders. Depending on the mandate, the
review might extend to implementing the findings. For
the New Zealand situation we were able to report find-
ings to the Ministry of Health and also aim to reach the
broader health sector in this country through describing
some of the findings in this article.
Application of surveillance sector review to infectious 
disease sector in New Zealand
County selection
New Zealand was selected for this review because of the
authors' in-depth familiarity with its systems and because
this country is small and organisationally simple for a
developed country (ie, it has no state or provincial gov-
ernments and no agencies at the national level with sig-
nificantly competing roles). Furthermore, infectious
diseases remain an important concern for this country's
health sector given the role they play in morbidity and
mortality and the absence of an overall decline in inci-
dence or health impact [18,19].
Search strategy for the New Zealand systems
We carried out an extensive review that aimed to identify
all the current infectious disease surveillance systems in
New Zealand. A literature review was performed by
searching articles in Ovid Medline using MESH headings
and Google Scholar, using search terms such as "surveil-
lance", "infectious disease" and "New Zealand". Articles
from 1 January 1990 to December 2009 were included in
the search. The search also covered key websites of
national surveillance providers such as the website of ESR
and the websites of surveillance end-users such as those
of the Ministry of Health, Department of Labour, Minis-
try for the Environment, Pharmac, Medsafe, StatisticsBaker et al. BMC Public Health 2010, 10:332
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New Zealand, New Zealand Food Safety Authority and
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (which includes Bio-
security New Zealand). Information was mainly extracted
from reports found on these websites, however some
information was also found directly from the websites
themselves. Information was also found by referring to
key infectious disease guidelines such as the Ministry of
Health's "Communicable Disease Control Manual" [20],
and the "Manual for Public Health Surveillance in New
Zealand" [21]. As the information was found, it was sum-
marised in tabular form to identify and describe the sys-
tems.
Key informant interviews in New Zealand
Once an extensive review had been performed, key infor-
mants with expertise in infectious diseases in New Zea-
land were interviewed either by telephone (n = 6) or face-
to-face (n = 12) to clarify and confirm the information
gathered. Informants were either academics, working for
agencies that run infectious disease surveillance, or speci-
alised clinicians involved in the infectious disease part of
the health sector. At least one informant specialising in
each of the 12 infectious diseases categories was inter-
viewed and each was asked to critically review the infor-
mation related to their area of expertise. They were also
asked whether there were any systems that had not been
identified for disease, hazard, determinant or interven-
tion surveillance. The final draft of the document was
also reviewed by 13 of the same informants. Results were
further checked by the authors through direct inquiries
with public health workers and surveillance system oper-
ators and review of published material.
The final revision of the manuscript for this article ben-
efited from discussions that took place as part of a subse-
quent Ministry of Health review of New Zealand's
infectious disease surveillance capacity.
Results
Infectious disease surveillance systems identified
For the 12 coherent categories of infectious diseases
examined, we identified 91 systems and related activities
for surveillance of diseases, hazards, determinants and
interventions. These systems are shown in Additional File
1 and listed in more detail in Additional File 2. As noted
in the Methods Section, some of these activities are not
formally described as public health surveillance systems
but do provide essential ongoing information (eg, the
five-yearly population census). There is also potential to
combine or sub-divide some of these systems (eg, the
notifiable disease surveillance system). Consequently, the
final total of systems is somewhat arbitrary.
We identified 40 systems (44% of the total) for surveil-
lance of infectious diseases and outcomes. All 12 infec-
tious disease categories were covered, to varying degrees.
Several systems monitored disease outcomes in multiple
categories, such as the Mortality Data Collection
(deaths)[22], National Minimum Data Set (NMDS) (hos-
pitalisations)[23], the Notifiable Disease Surveillance Sys-
tem[24], New Zealand Paediatric Surveillance Unit
(uncommon infections in children)[25,26], Notifiable
Occupational Disease Surveillance System (infections
acquired at work) [27], and outbreak surveillance[28]. In
addition, most disease categories also had specialised sur-
veillance systems for specific diseases, notably influenza
[29-31], HIV/AIDS [32,33], sexually transmitted infec-
tions (STIs) [34], transfusion related infections [35],
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) [24], and HAIs [36,37].
The surveillance of upstream hazards for infectious dis-
eases used a further 31 identified systems (34% of the
total). All categories of infectious disease had hazards
that were covered, except for infections from close physi-
cal contact. These systems could be considered in several
ways, including the types of hazards under surveillance.
Several systems (n = 4) focused on surveillance of micro-
bial agents and their characteristics, notably antimicro-
bial resistance surveillance of organisms from humans
[38] and food animals [39] and surveillance of agents in
relation to vaccine composition [40,41]. Seven systems
focused on behavioural factors (knowledge, attitudes,
practices) influencing infectious disease risk. These fac-
tors included sexual behaviour [42,43], tobacco use [44],
food handling [45], hand washing by healthcare staff in
hospitals [46], hand sanitiser use by hospital visitors
[47,48], and registration of skin piercing practitioners
[49]. Two systems focused on identifying infected people
w h o  m i g h t  p o s e  a n  i n f e c t i o u s  d i s e a s e  r i s k  t o  o t h e r s ,
including hospitalised patients [36] and pregnant women
[50-52]. Only one system specifically measured exposure
incidents, and that was for needle-stick injuries (although
data were not collated nationally).
Five systems were concerned with surveillance of con-
tamination levels of food [53-56] and drinking water[57].
Four systems were concerned with surveillance of spe-
cific environmental events and contaminant levels in a
range of settings, including recreational water [58], and
less developed systems for cooling towers, swimming
pools, and hospital operative equipment.
There were a total of five systems concerned with sur-
veillance of zoonotic infections that might also pose a risk
to human health [59-64]. We identified a further three
systems concerned with borders and introduction of new
pathogens and their vectors (focusing on detection of
mosquito vectors [65,66], arboviruses [67], and other
pests and new organisms [68]).
We have listed six activities that generate data on the
size of the potentially exposed population. On their own,
these activities are not surveillance systems but are
included in this review because of the critical information
they provide for surveillance purposes. For example, theBaker et al. BMC Public Health 2010, 10:332
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five-yearly census provided population data for most
infectious disease categories [69]. These data were sup-
plemented by more specialised sources where specific
sub-populations were relevant, notably for births [70],
overseas travellers [71], and the hospitalised popula-
tion[23]. Apart from providing basic demographic data,
these data sources generally did not provide much infor-
mation about the characteristics of those populations
that could be used to assess risk and protective factors. A
recent addition is New Zealand Health Tracker, which
combines data from multiple national data collections,
along with primary health organisation (PHO) enrol-
ments, to provide denominator populations that can be
analysed according to chronic disease status.
In addition to population size and characteristics, we
identified three other determinant areas where informa-
tion was being gathered. These areas were socio-eco-
nomic [72-74], environmental [75], and health sector
conditions [76]. All of these areas were monitored and
reported on by central government agencies. However ,
results were not fully integrated into the infectious dis-
ease surveillance sector. The one exception was socio-
economic position where disease cases could be linked to
the deprivation level of their domicile area (via the small
area-based deprivation measure: NZDep2006 [77]) allow-
ing the impact of socio-economic inequalities to be mea-
sured and monitored over time.
We identified 11 surveillance systems that focused on
interventions. Such surveillance was most evident for
vaccine preventable infections with four systems for
aspects of immunisation coverage [30,78-81], plus
adverse events surveillance [82,83], and cold-chain moni-
toring for vaccines [84,85]. There was a system for sur-
veillance of food borne disease interventions (auditing of
food control plans [55]), compliance with drinking water
standards [57], and the capacity for surveillance of con-
tact tracing and prophylaxis (tuberculosis, meningococ-
cal disease, hepatitis A, and pandemic influenza).
Systematic description of current surveillance systems
The key features of all 91 identified infectious diseases
surveillance systems and related activities are systemati-
cally described in Additional File 2. All the systems had a
specific event(s) under surveillance. The disease surveil-
lance systems (n = 40) mostly monitored disease outcome
by measuring disease incidence. The hazard (n = 31),
determinant and population (n = 9) and intervention (n =
11) surveillance systems varied in the type of event they
were monitoring. For example, upstream surveillance for
vaccine preventable infections focused on vaccine cover-
age (which we have classified as an intervention, but
which could also be a hazard if the focus is on the risk
posed by under-immunised populations) [78,80].
We classified 44 systems (48%) as exclusively strategy-
focused, 11 systems (12%) as control-focused, and 36 sys-
tems (40%) as meeting both control  and  strategy  pur-
poses. There was a tendency towards more control-
focused  surveillance of hazards and interventions than
was seen for diseases and determinants.
Each surveillance system had a set population or setting
it aimed to cover. For many of the disease surveillance
systems this was the total population, however some sys-
tems were aimed at specific subgroups (eg, the Notifiable
Occupational Disease System covers only those who are
employed [27]). Most of the hazard surveillance systems
covered only a sample of the population or settings. The
surveillance of determinants aimed to cover a representa-
tive sample of the whole population or specific environ-
ments, using the census and large-scale national surveys
and data collections. Coverage for the surveillance of
interventions depended on the intervention. Since most
interventions aimed to reach an entire population, the
associated surveillance activity was similarly based (and
depended on a representative sample of the target popu-
lation, or all individuals in that population if it was track-
ing delivery of the intervention).
The identified surveillance systems varied in their type
(as defined in the Methods Section). Disease surveillance
was generally based on event surveillance (n = 15) and
monitoring (n = 15) of incident cases. There was less use
of active methods such as screening (n = 5) and prevalence
surveys (n = 4). Multiple system types were used in some
environments (eg, HAI surveillance in hospitals). Hazard
surveillance was more reliant on active information col-
lection processes, notably screening (n = 10), and periodic
prevalence surveys (n = 6), though still used event surveil-
lance (n = 4) and monitoring (n = 3). Determinant surveil-
lance, including measuring the size and characteristics of
the population, used monitoring (n = 4), periodic preva-
lence surveys (n = 3), and combinations of the two (n = 2).
Intervention surveillance tended to use service tracking (n
= 7), with far less use of monitoring (n = 2), and preva-
lence surveys (n = 1).
Surveillance systems require data collection, collation
and analysis. Key features of the system architecture are
summarised in Additional File 2, which lists the reporting
source, local/regional collation, and national collation.
Occasionally the same group undertook all three tasks
within a surveillance system eg, some surveillance by the
New Zealand Food Safety Authority [53-56], and Biose-
curity New Zealand [59-63,86,87]. But usually data were
reported by different individuals from those who per-
formed the collation and analysis.
Most disease surveillance systems, not surprisingly,
were dependent on clinicians recognising and reporting
cases. There is a legal requirement to report certain dis-Baker et al. BMC Public Health 2010, 10:332
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eases (eg, the notifiable disease system[24]), while others
are reported voluntarily (eg, to the New Zealand Paediat-
ric Surveillance Unit [25,26]). Hazard surveillance
involved a much wider range of reporting sources, which
tended to be associated with a particular activity or prod-
uct, often monitored at the industry level and only scru-
tinised at the national level periodically or if an outbreak
occurs. Determinant surveillance was run at a national
level by relevant government agencies. Intervention sur-
veillance was run by varying groups depending on the
specific intervention under surveillance.
About one third of data collation and analysis included
a local or regional level prior to transmission to a
national-level agency. This is a key role for public health
services where such data are used to guide control-
focused  actions such as contact management and out-
break investigation and control. This function also hap-
pens at an institutional level, such as for District Health
Board (DHB) infection control surveillance. At the
national level, collation functions were often performed
by groups within the relevant policy agency (notably
Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry,
Department of Labour, Accident Compensation Corpo-
ration, Ministry for the Environment). There were also
several specialised surveillance agencies and units that
performed these national collation, analysis and report-
ing functions on contract to the Ministry of Health (nota-
bly ESR, New Zealand Paediatric Surveillance Unit, AIDS
Epidemiology Group, Centre for Adverse Reactions Mon-
itoring). In the case of Statistics New Zealand, the collec-
tion, analysis and dissemination of robust data are its core
business activities.
Potential gaps in infectious disease surveillance
The first major stage of a surveillance sector review, pre-
sented here, has provided a systematic description of the
infectious disease surveillance sector operating in New
Zealand. On its own, this description cannot identify
important surveillance sector gaps. That subsequent
stage (see Figure 2), requires careful description of the
information needs of the end-users of surveillance out-
puts, assessment of the performance of current surveil-
lance systems, and then a systematic assessment of the
potential gaps identified. However, the systematic
description of surveillance systems can identify gaps that
are likely to be important. This is particularly the case for
design/structural gaps (see Table 1). Some examples of
potential gaps are listed below to illustrate the value of
this systematic description:
•  Potential surveillance systems gaps: These gaps
occur when there is no surveillance system established
for important disease events, upstream hazards, determi-
nants or interventions. Assessing such gaps depends on
knowledge of which events are important. However, it is
reasonable to assume that all disease areas should have
sufficient surveillance systems to be able to characterise
the disease burden and identify emerging health threats.
All infectious disease categories had systems in place
for disease surveillance, at least for severe outcomes like
deaths and hospitalisation [22,23]. Two areas appeared to
have a comprehensive set of established systems covering
diseases, hazards, and interventions. These areas were
surveillance of vaccine preventable infections and food
borne infections. They included many of the diseases that
are prone to outbreaks and are under intensive ongoing
surveillance through the notifiable disease surveillance
system. Both areas regularly analysed and reported on
disease burden and used this information to inform pre-
vention activities [80,88]. At the other extreme, respira-
tory infections and infections from close contact
appeared poorly covered by surveillance systems, with lit-
tle focus on upstream  hazards and interventions.
Although individual hospitals had systems for surveil-
lance of hospital-acquired infections, there was little
aggregation of these data nationally.
Potential surveillance system gaps tended to be for less
severe illness at the community and primary care level.
There was a particular lack of a well established primary
care surveillance system, except for notifiable diseases
[24], influenza-like illness [30], and some events under
laboratory surveillance [89]. New Zealand has success-
fully piloted syndromic surveillance in the past for condi-
tions such as gastroenteritis and skin and subcutaneous
tissue infection [90]. But such surveillance is now largely
absent (except for influenza-like illness [30]).
There were many potential gaps in hazard surveillance.
For congenital and perinatal infections, national surveil-
lance of HIV infection in pregnancy has only recently
commenced [51,52] and there is little national surveil-
lance of other infectious hazards in this category[91].
Behavioural risk factor surveillance remains limited for
STIs [42,43]. The New Zealand Sexual Health Survey,
which aimed to collect data on health-related risk and
protective behaviours was piloted in 2006, but is cur-
rently (as of 2009) either on hold or possibly abandoned.
There is little surveillance of hazards for respiratory
infections, apart from smoking [92] and no surveillance
for factors influencing the risk of infections from close
physical contact, such as skin infections. By contrast,
some categories of infectious disease included multiple
hazard surveillance systems, such as food borne infec-
tions [53-56].
There were not many surveillance systems aimed at
monitoring disease interventions and therefore many
potential gaps. In some instances, such as surveillance of
contact prophylaxis and treatment, there is considerable
disease control work being carried out by health profes-
sionals. However, the surveillance systems have not beenBaker et al. BMC Public Health 2010, 10:332
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fully developed and implemented to capture such data so
that it can be used to guide disease control practices and
prevention policies.
• Potential surveillance scope gaps: These gaps occur
where a surveillance system is established, but its type,
range of events covered, and scope of information it is
designed to collect does not meet its purpose. Some of
these potential gaps are apparent from the systematic
descriptions presented here.
Some of the surveillance systems identified did not
monitor the full range of important events within their
scope. An example is latent or asymptomatic disease (eg,
HIV, hepatitis B and hepatitis C infection, and some
STIs). These forms of infection are poorly covered by
most infectious disease surveillance systems, which are
orientated towards measuring the incidence of acute clin-
ical infections. Such diseases are often not diagnosed
until disease is symptomatic and more serious. A new
Public Health Bill has been proposed for New Zealand to
classify Chlamydia infection, gonorrhoea, HIV infection
and syphilis as notifiable diseases [93]. This change
should improve STI surveillance and guide prevention
efforts to reduce disease.
A further issue around scope arises from the observa-
tion that some (n = 11) of the control-focused surveillance
systems do not supply information to support strategy-
focused surveillance (eg, serological testing of new prison
inmates, immigrant screening for tuberculosis, most
antenatal screening for infectious diseases). This problem
is particularly common in surveillance of upstream haz-
a r d s  i n  h e a l t h ca r e  s e t t i n gs  ( e g,  s u rv e i l la n c e  o f  pa t i e n ts
colonised with high risk organisms and contaminated
operative equipment) and for hazards in the community
(eg, surveillance of contaminants in cooling towers and
public swimming pools). All of these systems have the
potential to supply aggregated data for strategy-focused
surveillance.
The type of surveillance systems appeared to match
their main purpose, at least as described. For example,
control-focused  systems used types of surveillance (ie,
event surveillance, screening, and service tracking) that
should be able to provide suitable surveillance informa-
tion to support their purpose. However, it is not possible
to say from a description that these systems achieved the
necessary performance (eg, in terms of high sensitivity
and timeliness).
• Potential surveillance coverage gaps: Some surveil-
lance systems identified the appropriate events but did
not monitor all of the necessary populations or settings.
One example was the clinic-based surveillance of STIs.
Data were only reported from participating sexual health
clinics, family planning clinics, and student and youth
health clinics [34]. Many individuals with STIs see their
general practitioner and consequently may not be
recorded (except through laboratory-based surveillance
which remains incomplete [34]). Consequently, STI sur-
veillance data are far from being representative of the
general population.
Another example is the surveillance of refugees and
immigrants entering New Zealand. All quota refugees are
monitored through the Mangere Refugee Resettlement
Centre [94]. However this system misses the refugees
entering under family reunification or asylum seekers for
whom there is no organised screening programme [95].
Another coverage gap is for HAIs. Data are collected on
various HAIs within each hospital and to a certain extent
each DHB. However, because the databases and denomi-
nator information used within each DHB are different, it
is difficult to collate and compare data nationally [36].
Discussion
Key findings
A s  f a r  a s  w e  c a n  a s c e r t a i n ,  t h i s  i s  t h e  f i r s t  p u b l i s h e d
attempt to describe the entire infectious disease surveil-
l a n c e  s e c t o r  a t  a  c o u n t ry  l ev e l .  F u r t h e r m o r e ,  i t  i s  a l s o
unique in encompassing upstream hazards, determinants
and interventions along with the more traditional empha-
sis on disease and health outcomes. This description rep-
resents the first major stage in a surveillance sector review
aimed at identifying high priority improvements to these
integrated sector-wide systems.
In this small, developed country, all categories of infec-
tious disease had some form of surveillance, at least for
severe outcomes. Most of the large, widely used national
infectious disease surveillance systems were aimed at
measuring disease outcomes, particularly disease inci-
dence. There were many smaller, narrower systems look-
ing at specific infectious disease hazards. However, these
systems generally did not attempt to cover all the hazards
in a disease category and thus there are many potential
surveillance gaps that require further assessment. The
surveillance of interventions was even less well covered
with only a small number of systems identified for the
whole infectious disease sector. The surveillance of deter-
minants was achieved by large-scale prevalence surveys
and ongoing monitoring by national policy agencies.
Advantages of a surveillance sector review
A surveillance sector review approach has some advan-
tages compared with evaluating individual surveillance
systems (see Appendix 2). It deliberately 'looks at the for-
est instead of the trees'. This perspective allows consider-
ation of a wider set of issues than would be covered by
evaluation of individual surveillance systems [3]. In par-
ticular, it can consider sector development in a more stra-
tegic way, and specifically identify gaps in surveillance
and areas where investing greater effort could result in
public health gain. For that reason, a surveillance sectorBaker et al. BMC Public Health 2010, 10:332
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review should be a useful tool to support the assessment
requirements of the new IHR which take an all-hazards
approach [2].
One generic driver is the need to shift the focus to
upstream hazards and determinants to provide a surveil-
lance base to support prevention actions. Such a shift
requires knowledge of disease causal pathways to identify
suitable upstream surveillance points.
A related strength of the surveillance sector review
approach is that it supports opportunities for greater
integration of surveillance activities. Such integration
could occur across diseases or between disease and
upstream hazards, determinants and interventions. One
consequence of such integration could be a gain in effi-
ciency if the review process identifies surveillance activi-
ties that could be stopped (eg, where there was
duplication or where effort could be shifted upstream to a
more suitable surveillance point).
The categorisation we are using may also provide useful
insights when considering opportunities for improved
surveillance. Such opportunities may come from deliber-
ately building surveillance activities on existing disease
control activities. For example, we identified a number of
control-focused  surveillance activities, such as needle-
stick injury surveillance, where these is currently no col-
lation of information for strategy-focused purposes. Util-
ising such information sources is likely to be more
efficient than developing separate surveillance systems.
Disadvantages and limitations of a surveillance sector 
review
A surveillance sector review approach also has disadvan-
tages and limitations (see Appendix 2). By its very nature,
this approach provides only a broad overview of the sur-
veillance systems operating across a disease sector. It
does not attempt to evaluate the performance of individ-
ual systems in depth. That process requires a far more
intense focus on individual systems. Methods for such
evaluation are well described [3].
This review method also has a number of definitional
difficulties, including: establishing the scope of public
health surveillance activities; distinguishing these activi-
ties from investigation and research; deciding how sur-
veillance activities should be divided or aggregated; and
drawing the boundaries of the sector being reviewed (in
this case infectious diseases).
The defining features of public health surveillance sys-
tems are that the activity is: (i) ongoing, (ii) based on col-
lection and use of information, and (iii) linked to public
health action to protect and improve health [3]. Some of
the systems included in this review do not currently have
all of these features. Because this review process is
attempting to identify opportunities for surveillance sec-
tor improvement, we took a wide approach to identifying
information gathering processes that might contribute to
infectious disease control and prevention, even if not cur-
rently defined as a surveillance system (eg, inspection and
testing of cooling towers for organisms that cause legion-
ellosis). A related issue was whether to include systems
that are only operating at a local level, particularly those
at the pilot stage. This review has erred on the side of
including such systems, particularly where they illustrate
an approach that has potential for further development.
An example is the pilot sentinel system for influenza-like
illness surveillance based in one hospital emergency
department [96].
A related boundary is with investigation and research.
Given that such activities are not usually ongoing, they
are not included as surveillance systems. However, preva-
lence surveys and other studies can be repeated periodi-
cally to provide ongoing information. And many
surveillance activities are highly integrated with investi-
gation and research. For that reason, some reviews of sur-
veillance combine these activities with 'studies' as both
approaches aim to provide information to guide an effec-
tive public health response [97].
Dividing surveillance activities into discrete systems is
somewhat arbitrary, so the number of systems listed here
is only indicative. For example, organisms collected for
public health surveillance purposes, such as Mycobacte-
rium tuberculosis, may contribute to both disease surveil-
lance (notably outbreak detection) and hazard
surveillance (notably antimicrobial resistance testing),
which have been listed as two separate systems. In other
areas, particularly determinants, we have grouped a num-
ber of surveillance systems into a single named activity. It
can also be difficult to categorise some surveillance sys-
tems into separate disease, hazard and intervention areas.
Effective surveillance of tuberculosis, for example, sup-
ports all of these activities. Similarly, surveillance of com-
pliance with food control plans and drinking water
standards provides information on the distribution of
both hazards and interventions.
The boundary of infectious disease surveillance also
becomes less clear as one moves away from systems that
are exclusively concerned with surveillance of disease.
Most of those involved in surveillance of upstream haz-
ards and determinants would not define their work as
infectious disease surveillance. Similarly, some of the
health consequences of infectious diseases would not
necessarily be included in this sector. For example, sur-
veillance of cervical cancer (including screening) could
justifiably be included in this review because this disease
is largely an outcome of infection (with human papilloma
v i r u s ) .  F o r  t h e s e  r e a s o n s ,  t h i s  r e v i e w  i s  l i k e l y  t o  h a v e
under-counted systems contributing to surveillance of
infectious diseases.Baker et al. BMC Public Health 2010, 10:332
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This review work to date is still just a 'snapshot' of the
situation in just one year (2009). For New Zealand, there
are important potential developments that are likely to
improve surveillance eg, the requirement for direct labo-
ratory notification to local public health services com-
menced at the end of 2007 and is likely to increase the
sensitivity and timeliness of such surveillance [98]. Pro-
posed legislative changes (a new Public Health Bill) would
revise the schedule of notifiable diseases by adding STIs
(including HIV infection, Chlamydia  infection, gonor-
rhoea and syphilis). It would also extend surveillance
(notification) requirements to some hazards, notably
microbiological contaminants in water cooling towers
and drinking water [93].
This analysis is just the first stage in a complete surveil-
lance sector review, which is currently (2009) underway in
New Zealand. This review will critically assess the poten-
tial surveillance gaps identified during this description of
the current sector. More importantly, it will assess these
gaps against the surveillance information required by
end-users for prevention and control of infectious dis-
eases.
The framework used here emphasises the identification
of surveillance sector gaps as potential opportunities for
system improvements. It is important to also recognise
the considerable strengths and successes of the sector
being reviewed and the ongoing review and development
work already underway.
The approach described in this paper (surveillance sec-
tor review and the associated descriptive framework)
needs to be used more widely to assess its value. It could
be applied to the infectious disease surveillance sector in
other countries to see if the pattern is comparable. It
would also be useful to apply this approach to other dis-
ease sectors such as injuries (where surveillance of both
outcomes and risk factors is already highly developed
[99]), chronic diseases (where risk factor surveillance is
particularly well developed for cardiovascular disease
[100]), specific hazards (such as tobacco use [101]), and
to complex emerging determinants such as climate
change.
Conclusions
We have developed a novel approach for reviewing the
full range of surveillance systems required for a single dis-
ease sector at a country level (a surveillance sector
review) .  As  p a r t  o f  t h i s  a p p r o a c h  w e  a l s o  d ev e l o pe d  a
framework for categorising and describing surveillance
systems in a way that highlights their common and con-
trasting characteristics. This framework appeared useful
when applied to describing the infectious disease surveil-
lance systems in a single developed country (New Zea-
land) and was able to identify potential surveillance gaps
for further consideration. This approach and framework
could be used to support immediate goals such as assess-
ing surveillance capacity as part of the new IHR require-
ments. It also provides an approach that could be applied
to assessing surveillance of other disease, injury and haz-
ard sectors.
Appendix 1: Purpose and aims of public health 
surveillance
A. Control-focused surveillance - provides information to 
support control measures
1. Identify cases, hazards and other health-related events
that require a specific response
2. Track delivery, quality, and outcome of specific inter-
ventions
B. Strategy-focused surveillance - provides information to 
support prevention strategies
3. Monitor the occurrence and distribution of disease and
injury, including epidemiological, clinical and microbio-
logical features (specific to infectious diseases)
4. Monitor the occurrence and distribution of hazards,
risk factors and determinants and support improved pre-
vention measures
5. Monitor the impact of disease, hazards and determi-
nants on the population, health services, and wider soci-
ety, and help set priorities for prevention and control
measures
6. Monitor coverage and effectiveness of interventions
and programmes and support their evaluation
7. Support modelling and assessment of future scenar-
ios and interventions
8. Support research, including identifying hypotheses
for further investigation
9. Meet legislative and international reporting require-
ments
10. Monitor the context for surveillance, prevention,
and control actions, to guide system development
Appendix 2. Advantages and disadvantages of a 
surveillance sector review compared with 
evaluating individual surveillance systems
Advantages
• Can identify surveillance sector gaps, notably important
public health events that have little or no surveillance
• Shifts focus to upstream hazards and determinants
that might provide an improved surveillance base to
inform and support prevention actions
• Considers a set of issues that may be missed by evalu-
ation of individual systems, notably integration of infor-
mation from multiple systems
• Identifies sector issues such as leadership, coordina-
tion, mandate, organisation, workforce and resources that
affect multiple surveillance systemsBaker et al. BMC Public Health 2010, 10:332
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• Supports assessment of surveillance capacities
required for the International Health Regulations 2005
(IHR 2005) which take an all hazards approach
• Documents the full range of public health surveillance
activities which may facilitate greater use of the informa-
tion generated
• Provides a more consistent way of describing surveil-
lance methods across diverse types of health events
which may assist translation of best practice and
improved information quality
Disadvantages
• Requires considerable time and resources to conduct a
comprehensive review of a sector
• Cannot provide detailed assessment of the perfor-
mance of individual surveillance systems (systematic
evaluations of individual systems are still required)
• May raise difficult boundary issues regarding the
scope of the sector and the activities that constitute pub-
lic health surveillance
Additional material
Competing interests
Two of the authors (MB and NW) were contracted by the Ministry of Health to
assist with a Review of New Zealand's Infectious Disease Surveillance Capacity
that reported in late 2009. These authors have previously played a role in
establishing, running and evaluating some of the surveillance systems
described in this review.
Authors' contributions
MB and NW initiated this study. SE conducted the literature review and key
informant interviews and tabulated the key findings. MB and SE drafted most
of the paper. All authors read and approved the final manuscript.
Acknowledgements
The authors thank the key informants who kindly contributed their time: Helen 
Heffernan, Katherine Clift, Nigel Dickson, John Holmes, Quentin Ruscoe, Frank 
Darby, Annette Nesdale, Donald Campbell, Nikki Turner, Jane MacDonald, Pat 
Meade, Sue Huang, David Harte and Don Bandaranayake. This project had par-
tial funding support as part of the University of Otago's summer student pro-
gramme for funding one of the authors (SE).
The final revision of the manuscript benefited considerably from discussions 
that took place as part of the Ministry of Health's Review of New Zealand's 
Infectious Disease Surveillance Capacity (undertaken by two of the authors 
(MB and NW) and colleagues working for Allen and Clarke Policy and Regula-
tory Specialists Ltd, Wellington). Advisors to this review included Nicholas 
Jones, Paul White, Donald Campbell, Greg Simmons, Sally Roberts, Darren 
Hunt, Rebecca Blackmore, and Anna Gribble.
The paper was also considerably improved by incorporating excellent sugges-
tions from all three of the journal's reviewers.
Author Details
Department of Public Health, University of Otago, Wellington 23 Mein St, 
Newtown, Wellington, New Zealand
References
1. World Health Assembly: Revision of the International Health Regulations, 
WHA58.3 2005 [http://www.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/WHA58/
WHA58_3-en.pdf].
2. Baker MG, Fidler DP: Global public health surveillance under new 
International Health Regulations.  Emerg Infect Dis 2006, 12:1058-1065.
3. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention: Updated guidelines for 
evaluating public health surveillance systems: recommendations from 
the guidelines working group.  MMWR Recomm Rep 2001, 50(RR-
13):1-35.
4. Jajosky R, Groseclose S: Evaluation of reporting timeliness of public 
health surveillance systems for infectious diseases.  BMC Public Health 
2004, 4:29.
5. Jansson A, Arneborn M, Ekdahl K: Sensitivity of the Swedish statutory 
surveillance system for communicable diseases 1998-2002, assessed 
by the capture-recapture method.  Epidemiol Infect 2005, 
133(3):401-407.
6. Buehler JW, Hopkins RS, Overhage JM, Sosin DM, Tong V: Framework for 
evaluating public health surveillance systems for early detection of 
outbreaks: recommendations from the CDC Working Group.  MMWR 
Recomm Rep 2004, 53:1-11.
7. Miller M, Roche P, Spencer J, Deeble M: Evaluation of Australia's National 
Notifiable Disease Surveillance System.  Commun Dis Intell 2004, 
28(3):311-323.
8. McNabb SJ, Chungong S, Ryan M, Wuhib T, Nsubuga P, Alemu W, 
Carande-Kulis V, Rodier G: Conceptual framework of public health 
surveillance and action and its application in health sector reform.  
BMC Public Health 2002, 2:2.
9. Lopez AD, Mathers CD, Ezzati M, Jamison DT, Murray CJ: Global and 
regional burden of disease and risk factors, 2001: systematic analysis of 
population health data.  Lancet 2006, 367:1747-1757.
10. Armstrong T, Bonita R: Capacity building for an integrated 
noncommunicable disease risk factor surveillance system in 
developing countries.  Ethnic Dis 2003, 13:S13-18.
11. Kjellstrom T, Corvalan C: Framework for the development of 
environmental health indicators.  World Health Stat Q 1995, 48:144-154.
12. Porta A, Greenland S, Last JM: Dictionary of epidemiology 5th edition. New 
York: Oxford University Press; 2008. 
13. Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System   [http://www.cdc.gov/brfss/
index.htm]
14. Hardy KJ, Oppenheim BA, Gossain S, Gao F, Hawkey PM: A study of the 
relationship between environmental contamination with methicillin-
resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) and patients' acquisition of 
MRSA.  Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol 2006, 27:127-132.
15. Dowd SE, John D, Eliopolus J, Gerba CP, Naranjo J, Klein R, Lopez B, de 
Mejia M, Mendoza CE, Pepper IL: Confirmed detection of Cyclospora 
cayetanesis, Encephalitozoon intestinalis and Cryptosporidium 
parvum in water used for drinking.  J Water Health 2003, 1:117-123.
16. Ministry of Health: An integrated approach to infectious diseases: 
Priorities for action 2002-2006.  Wellington: Ministry of Health; 2001. 
17. Pruss A, Kay D, Fewtrell L, Bartram J: Estimating the burden of disease 
from water, sanitation, and hygiene at a global level.  Environ Health 
Perspect 2002, 110:537-542. 2002, 367:1747-1757.
18. Crump JA, Murdoch DR, Baker MG: Emerging infectious diseases in an 
island ecosystem: the New Zealand perspective.  Emerg Infect Dis 2001, 
7:767-772.
19. Mills CF, Tobias M, Baker M: A re-appraisal of the burden of infectious 
disease in New Zealand: aggregate estimates of morbidity and 
mortality.  N Z Med J 2002, 115:254-257.
20. Ministry of Health: Communicable disease control manual.  Wellington: 
Ministry of Health; 1998. 
21. ESR: Manual for public health surveillance in New Zealand.  Porirua: ESR; 
2006. 
Additional file 1 Infectious disease surveillance systems in New Zea-
land, classified according to infectious disease category and main 
event type under surveillance. A tabulated list of infectious disease sur-
veillance systems is presented, organised according to major infectious dis-
ease categories.
Additional file 2 Description of key features of infectious disease sur-
veillance systems identified in New Zealand. A detailed tabulated list of 
infectious disease surveillance systems in New Zealand is presented. Infor-
mation provided includes the system name, the event under surveillance, 
the main purpose, system coverage and type, reporting source and level of 
data collation (local, regional and national).
Received: 4 September 2008 Accepted: 11 June 2010 
Published: 11 June 2010
This article is available from: http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/10/332 © 2010 Baker et al; licensee BioMed Central Ltd.  This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. BMC Public Health 2010, 10:332Baker et al. BMC Public Health 2010, 10:332
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/10/332
Page 15 of 16
22. Data and statistics - Mortality Collection (MORT)   [http://
www.moh.govt.nz/moh.nsf/indexmh/dataandstatistics-collections-
mortality]
23. Data and statistics - National Minimum Dataset (Hospital Events) 
(NMDS)   [http://www.moh.govt.nz/moh.nsf/indexmh/dataandstatistics-
collections-nmds]
24. ESR: Notifiable and other diseases in New Zealand: 2009 annual 
surveillance report.  Wellington: ESR; 2010. 
25. Dow N, Dickson N, Taylor B, Darlow B, Wong W, Lennon D: The New 
Zealand Paediatric Surveillance Unit: establishment and first year of 
operation.  N Z Public Health Rep 1999, 6:41-44.
26. Taylor B, Dickson N, Phillips A: 2008 annual report of the New Zealand 
Paediatric Surveillance Unit (NZPSU).  Paediatric Surveillance Society of 
New Zealand 2009.
27. Driscoll T, Mannetje A, Dryson E, Feyer AM, Gander P, McCracken S, Pearce 
N, Wagstaffe M: The burden of occupational disease and injury in New 
Zealand: Technical Report.  Wellington: NOHSAC; 2004. 
28. ESR: Annual summary of outbreaks in New Zealand 2009.  Wellington: 
ESR; 2010. 
29. Huang QS, Lopez L, Adlam B: Influenza surveillance in New Zealand in 
2005.  N Z Med J 2007, 120:U2581.
30. Huang QS, Lopez LD, McCallum L, Adlam B: Influenza surveillance and 
immunisation in New Zealand, 1997-2006.  Influenza Other Respi Viruses 
2008, 2:139-145.
31. Baker MG, Wilson N, Huang QS, Paine S, Lopez L, Bandaranayake D, Tobias 
M, Mason K, Mackereth GF, Jacobs M, et al.: Pandemic influenza 
A(H1N1)v in New Zealand: the experience from April to August 2009.  
Euro Surveill 2009, 14(34):pii: 19319.
32. Paul C, Wilson M, Dickson N, Sharples K, Skegg DC: Enhanced surveillance 
of HIV infections in New Zealand, 1996-1998.  N Z Med J 2000, 
113:390-394.
33. AIDS Epidemiology Group   [http://dnmeds.otago.ac.nz/departments/
psm/research/aids/epi_surveill.html]
34. ESR: Sexually transmitted infections in New Zealand: annual 
surveillance report 2009.  Wellington: ESR; 2010. 
35. Haemovigilance Steering Group: National Haemovigilance Programme: 
annual report 2008.  Wellington: New Zealand Blood Service; 2009. 
36. New Zealand Audit Office: Report of the Controller and Auditor-
General: management of hospital acquired infection.  Wellington: The 
Audit Office; 2003. 
37. Nosocomial Infections Laboratory (NIL)   [http://www.esr.cri.nz/
competencies/communicabledisease/Pages/NIL.aspx]
38. Antibiotic Reference Laboratory (ARL)   [http://www.surv.esr.cri.nz/
antimicrobial/antimicrobial_resistance.php]
39. Antibiotic resistance and in-feed use of antibiotics in New Zealand   
[http://www.nzfsa.govt.nz/acvm/topics/antibiotic-resistance/index.htm]
40. Invasive Pathogens Laboratory (IPL)   [http://www.esr.cri.nz/
competencies/communicabledisease/Pages/IPL.aspx]
41. Virus Identification Reference Laboratory (VIR)   [http://www.esr.cri.nz/
competencies/communicabledisease/Pages/VIR.aspx]
42. Saxton P, Dickson N, Hughes A: GAPSS 2006: findings from the Gay 
Auckland Periodic Sex Survey.  Auckland: New Zealand AIDS 
Foundation; 2006. 
43. Grierson J, Thorpe R, Pitts M, Hughes A, Saxton P, Smith J, Smythe E, 
Thomas M: HIV Futures New Zealand 2, monograph series number 66.  
Melbourne: Australian Research Centre in Sex, Health and Society, La 
Trobe University; 2008. 
44. Ministry of Health: Seeing through the smoke: tobacco monitoring in 
New Zealand.  Wellington: Ministry of Health; 2005. 
45. Consumer surveys   [http://www.nzfsa.govt.nz/consumers/food-safety-
topics/consumer-surveys/]
46. Hand hygiene infection, prevention and control   [http://
www.infectioncontrol.org.nz/handhygiene/home.htm]
47. Murray R, Chandler C, Clarkson Y, Wilson N, Baker M, Cunningham R, 
Wellington R, Hand Hygiene Study Group: Sub-optimal hand sanitiser 
usage in a hospital entrance during an influenza pandemic, New 
Zealand, August 2009.  Euro Surveill 2009, 14(34):pii: 19331.
48. Manning S, Barry T, Wilson N, Baker M: Update: Follow-up study showing 
post-pandemic decline in hand sanitiser use, New Zealand, December 
2009.  Euro Surveill 2010, 15(3):pii: 19466.
49. Ministry of Health: Guidelines for the safe piercing of skin.  Wellington: 
Ministry of Health; 1998. 
50. National Health Committee: HIV screening in pregnancy: a report to the 
New Zealand Minister of Health.  Wellington: National Health 
Committee; 2004. 
51. Dickson N, McAllister S, Righarts A, Paul C: Universal routine offer HIV 
antenatal screening programme: quarterly report to the National 
Screening Unit, Ministry of Health. Quarter 3, 2008.  Dunedin AIDS 
Epidemiology Group 2008.
52. Morgan J, Mills G: Implementing the universal routine-offer antenatal 
HIV screening programme in New Zealand: results from the first year.  
N Z Med J 2007, 120:U2798.
53. Marine biotoxin monitoring and response manual for non-commercial 
shellfish   [http://www.nzfsa.govt.nz/consumers/food-safety-topics/
marine-biotoxin-alerts/m-b-m-r-manual/page-03.htm]
54. Animal products - national microbiological database (NMD)   [http://
www.nzfsa.govt.nz/animalproducts/publications/manualsguides/nmd/
index.htm]
55. Regulating food safety in the processed food and retail sector   [http://
www.nzfsa.govt.nz/processed-food-retail-sale/about/index.htm]
56. Importing - New Zealand Food Safety Authority - NZFSA   [http://
www.nzfsa.govt.nz/imported-food/procedures/index.htm]
57. Ministry of Health: Annual review of drinking-water quality in New 
Zealand 2007/8.  Wellington: Ministry of Health; 2008. 
58. Ministry for the Environment: Microbiological water quality guidelines 
for marine and freshwater recreational areas.  Wellington: Ministry for 
the Environment; 2003. 
59. Unwanted Organisms Register   [http://www.biosecurity.govt.nz/pests/
registers/uor]
60. McIntyre L, Rawdon T, Johnston C: Reports from MAF Biosecurity New 
Zealand - Animal health surveillance.  Surveillance  2009, 36:13-15.
61. Reports from MAF Biosecurity New Zealand - Animal Health 
Laboratory.   Surveillance  2009, 36:9-12.
62. Frazer J, Rawdon T, Stanislawek WL, McFadden A: Reports from MAF 
Biosecurity New Zealand - Avian influenza surveillance programme.  
Surveillance 2009, 36:17-18.
63. McIntyre L: Reports from MAF Biosecurity New Zealand - TSE 
surveillance programme.   Surveillance  2009, 36:21-22.
64. Livingstone P: Reports from National Pest Management Strategies - 
Bovine tuberculosis.   Surveillance 2009, 36:26-28.
65. Cane R, Disbury M: Online national mosquito surveillance database.  
Biosecurity 2007, 73:24-25.
66. Southern Monitoring Services   [http://www.smsl.co.nz/docs/
PageTemplate.asp?PageID=6]
67. McFadden A, McFadden B, Mackreth G, Clough R, Hueston L, Gradwell B, 
Dymond M: A serological survey of cattle in the Thames - Coromandel 
district of New Zealand for antibodies to Ross River virus.  New Zeal Vet J 
2009, 57:116-120.
68. Prime Consulting International Limited: An independent review of New 
Zealand's biosecurity surveillance systems.  Ministry of Agriculture and 
Forestry 2002.
69. 2006 Census data - Statistics New Zealand   [http://www.stats.govt.nz/
Census/2006CensusHomePage.aspx]
70. Births - Statistics New Zealand   [http://search.stats.govt.nz/nav/ct2/
population_births/ct1/population/0]
71. Migration - Statistics New Zealand   [http://www.stats.govt.nz/
methods_and_services/information-releases/international-travel-and-
migration.aspx]
72. Ministry of Social Development: The social report 2009: Indicators of 
social wellbeing in New Zealand.  Wellington: Ministry of Social 
Development; 2009. 
73. Ministry of Health: An indication of New Zealanders' health 2007.  
Wellington: Ministry of Health; 2007. 
74. Blakely T, Tobias M, Atkinson J, Yeh L-C, Huang K: Tracking disparity: 
trends in ethnic and socio-economic inequalities in mortality, 1981-
2004.  Wellington: Ministry of Health; 2007. 
75. Ministry of Health: Environmental Health Indicators for New Zealand 
2008.  Wellington: Ministry of Health; 2009. 
76. Ministry of Health: Health targets 2008/09 - annual results.  Wellington: 
Ministry of Health; 2009. 
77. Crampton P, Salmond C, Kirkpatrick R, Scarborough R, Skelly C: Degrees of 
deprivation in New Zealand: An atlas of socio-economic difference.  
Wellington: David Bateman; 2000. 
78. National Immunisation Register   [http://www.moh.govt.nz/nir]Baker et al. BMC Public Health 2010, 10:332
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/10/332
Page 16 of 16
79. Ministry of Health: The national childhood immunisation coverage 
survey 2005.  Wellington: Ministry of Health; 2007. 
80. Ministry of Health: Immunisation handbook 2006.  Wellington: Ministry 
of Health; 2006. 
81. Galgali G, Jack F: Collection of immunisation certificate information by 
primary schools.  N Z Pub Health Rep 2002, 9:1-4.
82. Pharmacovigilance in New Zealand   [http://www.medsafe.govt.nz/
profs/adverse/pharmaco.asp]
83. New Zealand Pharmacovigilance Centre: Centre for Adverse Reactions 
Monitoring   [http://carm.otago.ac.nz/index.asp?link=carm]
84. Raynel P, Jury M: The national cold chain audit: biannual report January 
to June 2007.  Environmental Science and Research 2007.
85. Immunisation Advisory Centre (IMAC) NZ   [http://www.immune.org.nz/
?t = 761]
86. Biosecurity Council: Tiakina aotearoa protect New Zealand: the 
biosecurity strategy for New Zealand.  Wellington: Ministry of 
Agriculture and Forestry; 2003. 
87. MAF Biosecurity New Zealand: Biosecurity surveillance strategy 2020.  
Wellington: MAF Biosecurity New Zealand 2009.
88. Lake RJ, Cressey PJ, Campbell DM, Oakley E: Risk ranking for foodborne 
microbial hazards in New Zealand: burden of disease estimates.  Risk 
Anal 2009.
89. Communicable disease surveillance activities   [http://www.esr.cri.nz/
competencies/communicabledisease/Pages/
CDSurveillanceactivities.aspx]
90. Jones NF, Marshall R: Evaluation of an electronic general-practitioner-
based syndromic surveillance system--Auckland, New Zealand, 2000-
2001.  MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2004, 53 Suppl:173-178.
91. Lawton B, Rose S, Bromhead C, Brown S, MacDonald J, Shepherd J: Rates 
of Chlamydia trachomatis testing and chlamydial infection in pregnant 
women.  N Z Med J 2004, 117:U889.
92. Ministry of Health: Clearing the Smoke: A five-year plan for tobacco 
control in New Zealand (2004 - 2009).  Wellington: Ministry of Health; 
2004. 
93. Summary of the Public Health Bill- Health Act review and the proposed 
Public Health Bill   [http://www.moh.govt.nz/moh.nsf/indexmh/
summary-public-health-bill]
94. McLeod A, Reeve M: The health status of quota refugees screened by 
New Zealand's Auckland Public Health Service between 1995 and 
2000.  N Z Med J 2005, 118:U1702.
95. Kizito H: Refugee health care: a handbook for health professionals.  
Wellington: Folio Communications Ltd; 2001. 
96. McLeod M, Mason K, White P, Read D: The 2005 Wellington influenza 
outbreak: syndromic surveillance of Wellington Hospital Emergency 
Department activity may have provided early warning.  Aust N Z J Public 
Health 2009, 33:289-294.
97. Nicoll A, Ammona A, Amato A, Ciancio B, Zucs P, Devaux I, Plata F, Mazick 
A, Mølbak K, Asikainen T, Kramarz P: Experience and lessons from 
surveillance and studies of the 2009 pandemic in Europe.  Public Health 
2010, 124:14-23.
98. Ministry of Health: Direct laboratory notification of communicable 
diseases national guidelines.  Wellington: Ministry of Health; 2007. 
99. Horan JM, Mallonee S: Injury surveillance.  Epidemiol Review 2003, 
25:24-42.
100. Evans A, Tolonen H, Hense HW, Ferrario M, Sans S, Kuulasmaa K, WHO 
Monica Project: Trends in coronary risk factors in the WHO MONICA 
project.  Int J Epidemiol 2001, 30(Suppl 1):S35-40.
101. Giovino GA, Biener L, Hartman AM, Marcus SE, Schooley MW, Pechacek TF, 
Vallone D, Giovino GA, Biener L, Hartman AM, et al.: Monitoring the 
tobacco use epidemic I. Overview: Optimizing measurement to 
facilitate change.  Prev Med 2009, 48:S4-10.
Pre-publication history
The pre-publication history for this paper can be accessed here:
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/10/332/prepub
doi: 10.1186/1471-2458-10-332
Cite this article as: Baker et al., A surveillance sector review applied to infec-
tious diseases at a country level BMC Public Health 2010, 10:332